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A

MONG THE MAJOR WESTERN MILITARY POWERS, the United States is
distinguished by non~participation in various core legal regimes gov~
erning armed conflict. Perhaps most significant is its continued refusal to ratify
the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, an in~
strument that most States consider the linchpin of this body oflaw. 1 Today, the
United States is one of only three NATO countries which is not Party to the
Protocol, and of the remaining two, France and Turkey, the former is expected
to ratify the agreement in the near future. The United States also rejected the
1997 Ottawa Treaty, which prohibits the use, stockpiling, production, or trans~
fer of anti~personnel mines. 2 By March 1999, over 135 States had signed or ac~
ceded to the treaty, including every NATO ally except Turkey. More recently
still, in 1998, the United States refused to sign the Statute of the International
Criminal Court (ICC) ,3 a constitutive instrument for the first permanent inter~
national tribunal to handle genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and
crimes of aggression. Of the countries represented at the Rome Conference,
where the final drafting of the Statute occurred, only seven voted against the
treaty. Joining the United States in opposition were China, Iraq, Israel, Libya,
Qatar, and Yemen, hardly an admirable grouping ofbedfellows.4 Such exam~
pIes are illustrative, not exhaustive. Over the past half decade, the United
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States has opposed or only incrementally moved towards ratification of any
number of additional treaties governing the conduct of warfare. 5
Despite the oft visceral condemnation of the U.S. position on these and
other issues involving the international law of armed conflict-criticism which
great powers with great power interests inevitably attract-in the vast majority
of cases the United States has articulated sound objections to the legal regime
concerned. For instance, it objects, inter alia, to provisions in Protocol I that
might act to legitimize malevolent national liberation movements6 and be,
lieves that the Ottawa Treaty as drafted would frustrate defense of the Korean
Peninsula. 7 As to the ICC Statute, the United States fears an expansive juris'
diction that could theoretically extend to members of the U.S. armed forces
over the objections of the United States government.8 One may question the
degree of risk posed by each of these possibilities, or even their relative likeli,
hood, but the fact of risk is difficult to dispute.
The dilemma is that sound objections do not necessarily render rejectionist
policy decisions wise. A State choosing not to participate in any partially objec,
tionable treaty regime would quickly find itself isolated in the global commu,
nity, for few legal instruments are innocuous in their entirety, and those that
are tend to lack substance. Instead, a "flaw" in a treaty mayor may not merit re,
fusal to opt into a pa.rticular regime.
In arriving at sound decisions regarding what course to pursue, the key lies in
the process of decision making. Of course, in some situations a matter is so
clear, cut that process is peripheral. For instance, a treaty proposing to outlaw
aerial warfare would hardly merit serious attention; there is little risk that faulty
decision making processes would lead to a bad decision on whether to ratify
such an instrument. As this extreme example exemplifies, the simpler the is,
sue, the more the decision,maker can rely on "informed intuition," the art of
drawing conclusions in the absence of absolutely dispositive data. Experience
and training allow him to intuitively perform those analytical steps necessary to
come to the right conclusion. However, as issues become more complex, it is
increasingly valuable to consciously and deliberately work through the decision
making process, one that may not be intuitively grasped. Lest such pro,
cess, orientation be deemed form over substance, it is important to grasp that
the motivation for such endeavors is substance through form.
In the field of national security there is no shortage of approaches to decision
making. 9 This essay proffers one methodology for making national security de,
cisions in the legal arena. It is an approach that is likely pursued, either intu,
itively or consciously, in many of the world's capitals. Indeed, it risks restating
the obvious. Nevertheless, much as there is value in proce~s itself, there is
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corresponding value in regularly contemplating process so as to perfect and
internalize it. Hopefully, the approach suggested here will help refocus atten,
tion on the art and science of process, thereby allowing decision,makers to ex,
ercise choice regarding the law of armed conflict in a way that optimizes
congruency with national interests. This will foster enhanced control over, and
an ability to shape, the international environment.
Before commencing, one caveat is in order. While discussion will include
comment on changes in the international environment that affect the dynam,
ics of the law of armed conflict, this essay is not meant to criticize or support
any particular policy decision that has been, or is likely to be, made. Rather, the
intent is to explore in a general way the how, not the what, of decision making
in the field. Additionally, although the essay is somewhat U.S.,centric in terms
of illustration and analysis, no criticism of specific decision making is in,
tended-the process described should be applicable to normative decision
making by any State.
The Nature of the Law of Armed Conflict
To understand process, it is first necessary to comprehend the medium in
which it will operate, in this case, the law of armed conflict. For many, law and
war are opposing constructs. War is the breakdown of law. Indeed, Carl von
Clausewitz dispenses with international law quickly in the opening paragraphs
of his classic, On War:
\Y/ar therefore is ... an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfill
our will .... Self imposed restrictions, almost imperceptible and hardly worth
mentioning, termed usages of International Law, accompany it without
essentially impairing its power... .10

Clausewitz's skepticism, writing as he was in the nineteenth century, is per,
haps understandable, for, by his time, advances in weaponry and the advent
of conflict involving whole societies, which really began with Napoleon's use
of citizen soldiers in the French Army of the 1790s, had caused war to become
a particularly brutal activity. It remained largely unregulated by any com,
prehensive or systematic normative framework throughout the century. Only
with Henri Dunant's publication of A Memory of Solfenno in 1862 did the notion of limiting the scale and scope of violence during armed conflict begin to
gain momentum. I I
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Today, by contrast, the role of the law of armed conflict clearly controverts
Clausewitz's characterization as "imperceptible" and "hardly worth mention~
ing." Aside from a very extensive collection of treaties, the law has proven
quite effective (although not infallible) in a number of twentieth century con~
flicts.1 2 It limits targeting decisions, restricts the use of various weapons, man~
dates treatment of prisoners of war and other detainees, protects
non~combatants, and sets forth the nature of occupation. The law of armed
conflict also articulates standards for the resort to force as an instrument of na~
tional policy, safeguards the rights of neutrals, and increasingly extends into
conflicts that are purely internal. Related bodies of law address such issues as
arms and weapons technology transfers, disarmament, emplacement of weap~
ons, and mechanisms for enforcement. The extensive debate over both the
NATO decision to bomb Serbia and the legality of striking the targets selected
during Operation Allied Force illustrates the degree to which legal issues have
come to pervade assessments of war and warfare. By the end of the twentieth
century, little doubt remains that law has the ability to shape conflict-that it is
a very potent form of soft power available to States and other international
actors.
Given its capacity to influence the actions of States, the law of armed con~
flict is essentially national policy expressed. After all, States are generally
bound only by those prescriptive norms to which they consent. Consent can be
signaled either by becoming a Party to a treaty or by participating in a practice
that eventually matures into customary law. Customary norms, like the prohi~
bition on directly targeting civilians or civilian objects, are those evidenced by
both consistent and widespread State practice and opinio juris, a conviction
that the practice is legally obligatory. 13 Although there is some debate over its
effect on either States that do not participate in the practice or newly emergent
ones,14 for all other States the requisite practice represents a form of policy
choice.
Characterization oflaw as policy choice is not meant to deny its moral com~
ponent; much law is clearly underpinned by rectitude. Yet to the extent a State
embraces the law of armed conflict out of adherence to moral principles, it has
implicitly made a policy choice based on what it deems to be in its national in~
terests. Many States view a moralistic quality to their national policy as benefi~
cial, either tangibly or intangibly, directly or indirectly. That does not detract
from the fact that the exercise of choice as to whether to participate in a legal
regime is nothing less than a policy decision driven by a State's desire to shape
armed conflict consistent with its particular national interests. Such States
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simply define their national interests in a way that incorporates a moral
dimension.
The concept of shaping is a seminal one. Warfare and the law of armed con~
flict enjoy a close symbiotic relationship. Since evolution in the conduct of war~
fare affects the individuals and objects which law seeks to shelter, it is not
surprising that progress in the law of armed conflict has tended to track major
conflicts and major technological advances with great regularity.l5 When it
does, it shapes future conflict. This dynamic is becoming increasingly conse~
quential. As an example, the direct targeting of civilian population centers, a
tragically regular occurrence during the Second World War, was unusual in
late twentieth century aerial attacks. When it does occur, as in Iraqi SCUD
missile attacks against Israeli cities during the 1990-1991 Gulf War, the global
reaction is one of outrage. The outrage is not only the product of moral con~
demnation, but also results from a sense that the rules of the game-the laws of
armed conflict-have been breached.
Law can even shape war for those not party to a particular normative stan~
dard. For instance, Additional Protocol I, which the United States has not rati~
fied, prohibits most attacks on dams, dikes, and nuclear electrical generating
stations. 16 Despite U.S. opposition to this particular provision, there have been
no U.S. attacks on any of these target sets since the Vietnam War; should it
conduct such an attack it would be condemned, for many will miss the fine dis~
tinction between a customary norm of international law, which binds all States,
and a treaty norm, which obligates only parties to comply.l7 Apprehension
over condemnation certainly influences the policy choice of whether to engage
in such strikes. This de facto effect of law on non~Party State actions can only
expand as military operations become increasingly multilateral in composition,
thereby frequently allying States with disparate legal obligations. In most such
cases, the greatest common normative denominator will apply. For instance, it
would be hard to imagine, e.g., U.S. forces in a coalition intentionally conduct~
ing an operation that would violate Protocol I, but no other legal regime, if any
significant coalition partners were parties to the treaty. The realties of coali~
tion~building and maintenance would simply not allow it.
So law and policy are closely related, in many cases overlapping, concepts.
Law is a form of soft power that can profoundly shape conflict in ways that may
or may not advance a particular State's interests. That being so, it is only logical
that States approach policy decisions concerning legal regimes in ways that
track processes of strategic choice regarding security affairs, the global econ~
omy, the environment, and so forth. Of course, the process of choice must be
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customized to the unique nature of law, but normative decisions are nonethe,
less classic examples of strategic choice.

The Process of Strategic Choice
The term "strategic choice" in the legal context implies decision making at
either the highest levels of government (as in the decision of whether to opt
into a treaty regime), or at a subordinate level when the decision results in na,
tionallevel fallout (as in determining whether to strike targets that may raise
questions of legality during a sensitive, and visible, conflict like Operation
Allied Force). Because law shapes, it is a strategic tool of national policy which,
as with any other tool, must be vectored. Strategic choice is the process by
which that vectoring occurs. It may take the form of opposing, supporting, or
suggesting changes to a draft treaty, deciding to employ force or use the military
in other coercive ways (or refraining therefrom), or conducting operations in a
way that raises law of armed conflict issues. Ultimately, the objective is to de,
termine how best to shape the international environment, including armed
conflict, to one's own advantage.

Step 1: Identify the Interests. Determining one's advantage begins by
identifying "national interests," a term of art used to refer to a State's highest
tier goals and concerns. I8 In the vast majority of cases, they may be grouped
into one of three categories-security, well,being or value. Security interests
are those involving physical security, territorial integrity, sovereignty, and the
maintenance of a society's core values, such as those expressed in the
Constitution. These interests are certainly implicated in the law of armed
conflict context, for to the extent law can shape war, it affects a State's ability
to defend itself and its allies. The use of anti,personnel mines on the Korean
peninsula serves as apt illustration. North Korean numerical superiority poses a
quandary for those planning defense of South Korea. Mines, particularly in
light of the Korean geography and topography, can be used to channelize
invading forces such that the defenders can concentrate firepower upon them.
To agree to remove anti,personnel mines from the U.S.,South Korean
inventory altogether, as mandated by the Ottawa Treaty, would be to deny this
option to those responsible for the defense of the country.
National interests based in well,being enhance quality of life. They often are
economic in nature Gobs, income, availability of goods, and so forth), but may
also extend to health care, educational opportunity, environmental quality,
leisure activities, convenience, and the like. Again, certain aspects of the law of
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armed conflict respond to such interests. For instance, the laws of neutrality
balance the "interests" of belligerents in effectively prosecuting a conflict with
those that neutrals have in continuing to engage in commerce.
Value interests are much more pervasive in the laws of armed conflict. They
comprise those externally focused interests that lie beyond our borders-de~
mocracy, justice, human rights, human dignity, and so forth. 19 Obviously, the
bulk of the law of armed conflict addressing how armed conflict may be con~
ducted, the jus in bello, falls within this category; in fact, increasing use of the
term "humanitarian law" in lieu of either the "law of armed conflict" or the
"law of war" is indicative of a growing commitment to the value aspects of this
corpus oflaw. So too is the recent involvement of U.S. and other forces in hu~
manitarian operations involving the use of force (e.g., Northern Iraq, Somalia,
Kosovo), operations which must be justified by that component of interna~
tionallaw governing the resort by States to force, the jus ad bellum. To the ex~
tent international law permits intervention for humanitarian purposes, value
interests are at play.
In fact, the two foundational objectives of the jus in bello-separating out
those who are involved in the fight from those who are not and limiting the
scope and nature of the violence that occurs during combat-are both
grounded in value interests. They acknowledge armed conflict as a fact of in~
ternational (and increasingly internal) activity, but seek to limit its impact on
the human condition. Thus, for example, ci~ilians may not be directly tar~
geted,20 medical facilities 21 and cultural objects receive special protection,22
and weapons that would needlessly exacerbate human suffering are forbid~
den.23 Such strictures represent a recognition that the destruction and hard~
ship war creates are, as a general matter, contrary to human values. To the ex~
tent States embrace these values, they represent a national interest that may be
fostered through strategic policy choices resulting in international law.

Step 2: Value the Interests. In assessing whether a particular strategic choice
regarding matters of law advances national interests, it is important to
understand that all national interests do not enjoy equal valence. Thus, they
must be valued. This is so because, as noted earlier, realization of most interests
comes at the expense of certain other ones. Avoiding civilian damage or injury
(a value interest), as an example, may require a mission to be executed in a less
than optimal way (a security interest). Additionally, the process is not a level
one, for a very rough hierarchy ofinterests exists. As a general matter, security,
well~being and value interests are ranked from high to low respectively. This a
Priori ordering reflects the fact that a State will ordinarily seek to survive before
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it attempts international self,actualization and will usually attribute
preeminence to its own interests over those of others. Obviously, in any
individual case, the intensity of interests may vary from this scheme, the
avoidance of civilian casualties just cited being one illustration. Nevertheless,
and regardless of whether one personally agrees with the "ranking," the reality
is that States do tend to broadly order interests along these lines.
The U.S. case serves as an example of the process. In A National Security
Strategy for a New Century, the White House has articulated u.S. national se,
curity interests. Three are core: enhancing security (obviously, a security inter'
est), bolstering America's economic prosperity (a well,being interest), and
promoting democracy abroad (a value interest).24 Of course, each is interre,
lated. Enhancing security safeguards economic wherewithal; economic pros'
perity makes security expenditures possible; democracy abroad diminishes
potential security threats and fosters trade, and so forth. Other States may har,
bor differing interests, or at least harbor them to a differing degree. For in,
stance, Luxembourg is probably less concerned about security interests than a
superpower such as the United States, whereas States such as North Korea,
Iraq, or Libya may well see the expansion of the democratic community as a
negative trend.
The United States values its interests by grouping them into three catego,
ries: "vital," "important," and "humanitarian and other." Vital interests in,
elude "physical security of our territory and that of our allies, the safety of our
citizens, our economic well,being and the protection of our critical infrastruc,
tures."25 Important national interests do not affect national survival, but do af,
fect U.S. national well,being and the character of the world. An example of
efforts to support important interests ineludes NATO operations in Bosnia,
Hercegovina. Finally, humanitarian and other interests are those which the
U.S. must safeguard because its "values demand it."26 Responding to disasters
or violations of human rights, supporting democratizati~n and civil control of
the military, and fostering sustainable development are all examples. Irrespec,
tive of the national interests themselves, the point is that strategic choice, in,
eluding normative strategic choice, should be exercised so as to advance the
overriding national interests, and that cannot be accomplished until the inter,
ests have been valued.

Step 3: Develop Objectives Advancing the Interests. The process of identifying
advantage continues with the development. of objectives for the national
interests. Conceptually, national interests imbue strategic choice with
direction, but they are too broad to be of practical utility themselves.
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Objectives, by contrast, are states of being that realize a national interest; they
are much narrower than interests. For example, whereas the defense of vital
U.S. allies is a U.S. national interest, the defense of South Korea from North
Korean attack is an objective. Care must also be taken not to confuse
objectives with strategies; an objective is "what" needs to be accomplished,
strategy the "how." Strategies are the methods by which objectives that
advance national interests are achieved.
Thinking in terms of opportunities and threats facilitates identifying objec~
tives,21 The process relies on the fact that all States seek both to exploit oppor~
tunities that advance national interests and counter threats to them. Thus,
objectives are always responsive to threats and opportunities (and aspirations).
The U.S. case exemplifies this approach. It has explicitly identified a number of
threats to its national interest in security at home and abroad-regional or
State centered threats (e.g., Iran, Iraq, North Korea), transnational threats
(terrorism, international crime, drug trafficking, illicit arms trafficking, uncon~
trolled refugee migration, and environmental damage), the spread of danger~
ous technologies (especially weapons of mass destruction), foreign intelligence
collection, and failed States. 28 This being so, its strategic objectives necessarily
include countering these threats. Similarly, U.S. superpower status, including
financial and military predominance, allows for greater influence (opportuni~
ties) in international security matters than any other State. The U.S. has lever~
aged this power, e.g., to assist in the. emergence of democratic institutions
throughout Eastern and Central Europe and, albeit somewhat controversially,
(and working through NATO) to arrest Serbian suppression of the Kosovars.
Other representative opportunities include such varied advantages as techno,
logical dependence on the United States by other countries and the excellence
of U.S. higher education. It should come as little surprise that U.S. strategic ob,
jectives include exploiting these opportunities.
For the law of armed conflict to have any meaning, it must either act to fore,
stall threat,based objectives or exploit opportunity,based ones. Most often, the
objective of law is to respon~ to a threat to a national interest. Examples in'
clude ensuring the broad security of the State (the jus ad bellum), protecting ci,
vilians, maintaining the civilian infrastructure, and continuing civil society
during occupation. However, the law of armed conflict also contains elements
of opportunity,based objectives. The principle of proportionality, for instance,
allows a commander to prosecute an operation despite collateral damage and
incidental injury so long as the quantum and quality of military advantage that
ensues is sufficient to outweigh the civilian consequences. 29 Similarly, when
justified by security concerns, civilians may be interned during an
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occupation.3° In both cases, the law acts to permit military forces to operate
without undue constraints.
Thus, strategic choice, even for matters involving the law of armed conflict,
requires clarity of goals. It is only after this has been achieved that support for
or opposition to a particular normative regime can possibly make sense, for it is
insensible to ignore threats to interests or oppose those proposals which ad~
vance one's ultimate interests.

Step 4: Value the Objectives. Once objectives that support the respective
national interests are identified, they must be valued. In most genres of
strategic choice, this process takes the form of ordering, that is, developing a
hierarchy of need as to a State's various objectives. At the risk of gross
oversimplification, such ordering is often mandated because the resources
available to pursue objectives are finite; the issue, then, is the allocation of
scarce resources. 3 ! A State may be forced, for instance, to choose between
buying fighter (re firepower) or transport (re mobility) aircraft. Mobility and
firepower are not inherently contradictory (arguably they are complementary),
but given limited resources, strategic choice must occur to determine which
option best effectuates the State's individualized national interests. Ordering
facilitates identifying the "best buy."
In the law of armed conflict context, however, ordering is necessitated by
the fact that the objectives often operate at cross~purposes. Resource alloca~
tion may surface as an issue (if weapon A is illegal, what must the State obtain
to compensate for the loss of capability?), but it generally is not heavily impli~
cated in the process of choice. This is because normative regimes do not di~
rectly consume resources; their cost is political and human, not fiscal. Instead,
objectives relevant to law, as noted earlier, may well clash. For instance, nu~
clear weapons pose enormous risk to the global community, but their use in
certain circumstances might actually deter acts of greater harm by malevolent
international actors. Indeed, the principle of reprisal (which is the subject of
much controversy) implicitly recognizes this conflict by allowing the resort to
proportional illegal acts to convince an opponent to desist from its own illegal
course of action. Because the dynamic is one of contradiction vice competition,
assessment of objectives is best thought of in terms of net valuation instead of
vertical ordering. The process will often compel strategic choice involving bal~
ancing designed to identify net gain, rather than simply plotting "value" along a
continuum.
In any event, many variables affect the value attributed to an objective. Fur~
ther, the importance ascribed to each will be determined in part by one's
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experience, education, ideological bent, and cognitive approach-in other
words by "informed intuition." Despite the complexity (and imprecision) of
valuation, several variables pervade the process.
Intensity: Among the most influential is the intensity with which the actor
holds the national interest in question. For instance, the United States views
the security of U.S. territory and that of its allies as a vital interest, whereas humanitarian concerns such as human rights are tertiary. This is consistent with
the general propensity for security to outweigh value interests. Intensity measurements render it theoretically reasonable to reject a proposed legal norm
that poses a moderate threat to security interests even though it might greatly
advance a value interest such as human rights.
The dispute over the nature of the legal regime that should be applied to information operations during armed conflict exemplifies the phenomenon.
Some argue that targeting instruments of communication which spread propaganda should be forbidden, emphasizing the contention that ideas must be defeated by the force of competing ideas, not the force of arms. Others counter
that such felicity to the idea of free speech (value interest) is naive, for propaganda can endanger the security of their forces and hinder mission accomplishment. They would, resultantly, oppose any limits on striking communications
targets, even though in the vast majority of scenarios the military benefits (security interest) of doing so are moderate at best.3 2 The point is that while the
interest being advanced is seldom dispositive, it certainly matters.
Likelihood: Objectives should also be valued in terms of likelihood. This
variable recognizes that the intensity of an interest must be qualified by the
likelihood that the opportunity in question will present itself or the threat will
become a reality. The Korean case is an excellent example. It is not enough to
say that the intensity of the security interest in defending South Korea outweighs the U.S. value-based interest in alleviating civilian suffering-in this
case that caused by anti-personnel mines. Rather, it is necessary to weigh the
very certain human suffering that anti-personnel mines will cause against the
likelihood of a North Korean invasion. Similarly, consider U.S. concerns over
the International Criminal Court Statute. There, the competing interests are
human rights and well-being versus security (for U.S. forces). The objective
which advances the former is punishment/deterrence of war criminals (in the
sense understood by laymen), while that which fosters the latter is avoidance of
placing U.S. forces at risk of politicized prosecution. Clearly, the prospect of
U.S. personnel facing prosecution by a politicized court merits attribution of
significant intensity value. That said, the multiple safeguards built into the ICC
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system, in great part in response to U.S. concerns, should serve to render the
likelihood of such an occurrence very low)3
Immediacy: A third recurring variable is immediacy, the extent to which
opportunity or threat objectives are near or long term)4 Near~term threat and
opportunity objectives should be accorded somewhat greater weight than
long~term ones. Of course, it could be argued that an immediacy criterion ob~
fuscates the process by sacrificing long~term objectives for immediate gratifica~
tion. However, it must be remembered that immediacy is but one of any
number of variables used to calculate value. More to the point, immediacy is
relevant because the further one projects into the future, the more speculative
that projection and the less certain any attempt to fashion the future as one de~
sires. The risk lies in forgoing an immediate opportunity only to find that future
opportunity is foreclosed for reasons that could not possibly have been fore~
seen. Along the same lines, deferring reaction to an immediate threat and
thereby suffering the consequences thereof in order to avoid a future threat,
may in retrospect prove ill~advised.
Again, consider anti~personnel mines. The U.S. desire to continue using
them in South Korea is a sensible military decision. However, this opportunity
objective must be viewed in light of the threat objective of precluding their use
against U.S. forces. In the last decade, U.S. forces and their allies have increas~
ingly been involved in peace operations, either Chapter VI or Chapter VII in
nature,35 where mines pose a particularly nasty threat. As this essay is being
written, they are currently hindering operations in Kosovo and the only casual~
ties KFOR forces have suffered have resulted from mines. Complicating mat~
ters is the fact that the likelihood of U.S. forces using mines themselves during
a peace operation is de minimus because most such operations are combined 36
in nature, and most forces operating with the U.S. will be prohibited from using
them. Their use by U.S. forces would create such a row in coalition partner
countries that for reasons of political expediency they are generally inutile. The
bottom line is that in the types of conflicts the U.S. is currently engaged in (and
the type it is likely to be engaged in any time in the near future), anti~personnel
mines are causing immediate dreadful civilian suffering and are an immediate
threat to U.S. forces. By contrast, their use in conventional large scale conflict,
such as that envisaged for the Korean peninsula, is, regardless of likelihood (a
different question altogether), temporally more remote.
Degree of Advancement/Harm: A fourth variable is the extent to which
exploitation of opportunity objectives may advance, or ignoring threat objec~
tives may harm, the interest in question. This differs from intensity, which sim~
ply asks how strongly held the interest is; here the query is the extent to which
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the objective advances the interest. It also differs from strategy, which is de,
signed to advance objectives. Recall that one u.s. national interest is security at
home, and that drug trafficking, illicit arms trafficking, environmental damage,
certain rogue States, failed States, and so forth are defined as threats thereto.
Countering each is a differing objective fostering the same interest. As between
these objectives, intensity is a constant. Yet, the degree to which successfully
achieving them advances the interest in security varies widely. Winning the
war on drugs is a very much different thing in terms of advancing national secu,
rity than winning the war against environmental degradation.
A similar phenomenon applies in the legal setting. For instance, operations
conducted in response to the failure of a State will not have the same valence in
terms of advancing national security interests as those executed in a
State,on,State context. This bears directly on the normative environment that
a State might seek because the shaping effect oflaw depends on the milieu in
which it operates. Resolution of issues such as detention of civilians, combatant
status, "occupation" activities, use of force, and neutrality may well depend on
whether the operations are conducted as part of an internal disturbance, inter,
nal armed conflict, international armed conflict, or some variant of peace
operation.
Finally, it must be grasped that valuation is not a mathematical calculation.
On the contrary, it is merely a process for helping decision,makers think
through what it is they should accomplish.

Step 5: Choose a Nonnative Strategy. To this point, no strategy decision has
been made, i.e., no actions have been proposed or refrained from. As noted,
strategies are game plans for how to accomplish the objective (the what) that
was identified and evaluated during the previous step. The process of strategic
choice writ large now turns to the identification and development of strategies
designed to effectuate the objectives just valued. This process, which has been
described in greater depth elsewhere,37 involves determining which of one's
objectives are "obligatory" (e.g., nuclear deterrence), and then appraising
others to determine how best to fashion an overall strategic plan that
maximizes opportunity and minimizes risk given finite resources.
Legal strategies must be assessed somewhat uniquely, if only because they
are less directly resource dependent than are most other national security strat'
egies. Of course, all strategic choice poses costs and benefits and requires
trade,offs. However, as alluded to earlier, non,legal choice is more often an ei,
ther,or proposition than is the case with legal choice. Strategies for the former
frequently come only at the expense of one another. Law, however, ofte~
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imposes a pluralistic predicament-for the proposed regime will often contain
both positive and negative elements-and does so as to myriad objectives. The
question is not so much the cost of the strategy as it is the harm its adoption will
generate. This being so, strategic choice may be depicted as follows:
(value of objective advanced) x (degree to which proposed legal strategy
advances that objective) minus (value of objective harmed) x (degree to which
proposed legal strategy harms that objective).

It must be emphasized that the "formula" is not intended to be objectively
quantifiable, but is only a way to order thoughts when making strategic choice.
The Korean scenario and its implications for anti~personnel mines may be
used, in a somewhat artificially simplistic and one~dimensional way, to demon~
strate the process. A properly sequential decision making calculation would
first determine how important the defense of South Korea (and other uses for
mines such as perimeter defense) is by considering, inter alia, the factors out~
lined above. It would also consider the degree to which availability of
anti~personnel mines contributes to that objective. Next, an assessment of the
importance of the objectives anti~personnel mines harm, like the well~being of
non~combatants and the safety of one's own forces from mines, and an estimate
of the extent to which the failure to adopt a ban sets them back, would be re~
quired. The alternative strategies involved are opposing and supporting a ban
respectively. Harm would then be subtracted from the benefit to suggest the
desirability of the strategy. Thus, in this process, net value is calculated by con~
sidering normative strategy holistically. Of course, the process, albeit easily ex~
plained, is extremely complicated. Multiple objectives may be involved,
intangible factors must be identified and valued, and dissimilar: phenomenon
must be balanced against each other. Nevertheless, the process does help order
analysis.
The last step, then, is to evaluate strategies. As with each of the steps, a mea~
sure of "informed intuition" is necessary; ultimately, the determination is sub~
jective. That said, it should be cognitively robust. Robustness demands, at a
minimum, considering four variables--opportunity costs, reverberating effects,
strategic multipliers/constraints, and hierarchical consequentiality.
Opportunity Costs: An opportunity cost is a measurement of those options
which are foreclosed should a particular strategy be chosen. For instance, in an
effort to scale down the nature and scope of violence on the battlefield (an ob~
jective), a protocol to the Conventional Weapons Convention (a normative
strategy) prohibits use of air~delivered incendiaries against valid military
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objectives within concentrations of civilians.38 Such a strategy comes at signifi,
cant cost, for incendiaries are particularly useful against certain targets, such as
bunkered, biological, or chemical facilities.3 9 Thus, adoption of the prohibition
costs the military commander a useful tool to achieve other valid objectives in
pursuit of national interests. Or consider nuclear weapons. There is little ques,
tion but that such weapons are extraordinarily destructive, so much so that the
International Court ofJustice has opined that their use in situations other than
self,defense where the survival of the State is at stake (and perhaps even then)
violates the law of armed conflict.40 Yet, as illustrated during the Gulf War, nu,
clear weapons may well be valuable in deterring the use of other weapons of
mass destruction, particularly those unavailable to the nuclear power as a result
of other normative strictures, such as the prohibitions on chemical and biologi,
cal weapons.41 Their unavailability to deter (or respond and compel an oppo,
nent to desist from further use) is an opportunity cost that must be considered
in appraising whether the State in question should support a normative strat,
egy opposing their possession or use.
Reverberating Effects: Related to opportunity costs is the reverberating ef,
fects variable. Whereas opportunity cost calculations are characterized by di,
rect tradeoffs among the objectives pursued, reverberating effect is the indirect
fallout from a particular strategy choice. Opportunity costs deny a warfighter
the opportunity to pursue a course of action that would advance an objective;
reverberating effects are the incidental costs associated with a particular strat,
egy choice.
Return to the incendiary example. A reverberating effect of the prohibition
thereon would be that warfighters might have to resort to weapons that would
actually cause greater collateral damage or incidental injury than would be the
case with incendiaries. Thus, while the opportunity cost is an inability or di,
minished capability to attack a target, the reverberating effect is unintended
harm to civilians and civilian property. As this case illustrates, a reverberating
effect may paradoxically bear on the very objective (protection of civilians and
civilian objects) that the prescriptive norm seeks to advance in the first place.
The prohibition on permanently blinding lasers found in the Conventional
Weapons Convention presents a similar example.42 As a result of the prohibi,
tion, commanders who would have otherwise employed blinding lasers to foir
an attack on their perimeter will be forced to resort to traditional weapons such
as mortars, mines (barring an Ottawa Treaty prohibition), and machine guns.
This is an opportunity cost. The reverberating cost is the increased collateral
damage and incidental injury that might result in certain circumstances from
the use of kinetic means of defense.
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Multipliers and Constraints: A third variable against which to measure
proposed normative strategies is the effect of multipliers and constraints. Stra,
tegic multipliers are factors, often contextual in nature, that further a strategy's
advancement of an objective. Conversely, strategic constraints limit fulfill,
ment. To illustrate, multipliers in a security strategy context might include bur,
den sharing, alliance operations, or even economic interdependency. The key
is to ask what conditions in the existing or future environment might render
success or failure of the strategy (whether it be supporting/opposing a proposed
legal regime or implementing one) likelier. With regard to normative strate'
gies, relevant multipliers or constraints could include such factors as public
support or opposition; intragovernmental dynamics; the attitude of intergov,
ernmental or nongovernmental organizations towards the strategy; the scope,
degree .and sources of support it receives from other governments; recent expe,
riences that might auger for acceptance of the strategy; media attention; the
relative success of analogous legal regimes; and so forth.
Take several recent opportunities for normative strategic choice. As an ex,
ample, some have asserted that the tragic death of the late Princess Diana, a
strident supporter of a ban on anti, personnel land mines, added much needed
impetus to the campaign to outlaw them, and contributed significantly to
adoption of the Ottawa Treaty. Thus, by this line of reasoning, her untimely
death represented a multiplier for mine opponents. Similarly, it should not be
surprising that the ICC Statute was adopted within a decade of the establish,
ment of the Hague and Arusha Tribunals, the first such international bodies
since the N uremburg and Tokyo trials. 43 By the same token, and perhaps some,
what cynically, one may argue that the Hague Tribunal is the partial result of
warfare (and the ensuing war crimes and crimes against humanity) touching
the face of Europe for the first time since 1945.
The point is not to provide a catalogue of potential multipliers and con,
straints. Rather, it is simply to demonstrate that the strategic environment
matters, and that, therefore, strategic choice is inevitably situational. For ex,
ample, imagine the difficulty of executing U.S. strategy vis,8.,vis the Kosovo
crisis had NATO support not been secured. In light of strategic choice's
situationality, what is a constraint today may be a multiplier tomorrow and vice
versa; some may be neither except in certain circumstances. Despite the uncer,
tainty, the net result of a multiplier!constraint analysis should be a better un,
derstanding of the proposed strategy's viability and the suggestion or exclusion
of alternatives.
Hierarchical Consequentiality and its Subtlety: Finally, what is often
missed in assessing strategies is an appreciation of their hierarchical nature and
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the oft subtle nature of their consequences. The consequences of normative
strategic choice lie at multiple levels of analysis. Such choices clearly affect the
tactical (battle) and operational (theatre) levels, for it is there that the armed
conflict is actually conducted. To the extent the overall course of the conflict
shifts, an impact is also felt at the strategic (national) level. What is perhaps
counterintuitive, however, is that strategies may not operate in parallel at the
various levels of analysis; strategies may have disparate hierarchical impact,
that is, they may generate benefits at one level and harm at another.
Usually, States are fairly adept at identifying immediate tactical and opera'
tionallevel consequences of normative proposals, for warfighters who would be
deprived of weapons, targets, or tactics by the laws of armed conflict can rather
reliably estimate how a particular stricture will affect them. States are also
skilled at identifying strategic level impact on the war effort. After all, legal pre,
scriptions allow or disallow a course of action that one wishes to take or that
another is threatening. The very fact of the desire to act or apprehension of an
opponent's action suggests that some rational calculation of advantage or harm
has occurred.
Not surprisingly, the subtler consequences of normative strategy are often over,
looked. Several examples may help illustrate. During the Falklands/Malvinas con,
flict, both the United Kingdom and Argentina made a strategic decision to
carefully comply with the law of armed conflict. As a result, both war termination
and the return to normalcy of relations between the two States were facilitated,
thereby advancing national interests other than those directly implicated in
the decision to employ force to settle their differences. A sense that Coalition
forces would abide by the laws of armed conflict regarding the treatment of
prisoners likewise contributed in no small measure to the unprecedented will,
ingness of many thousands ofIraqi soldiers to surrender as early as possible dur,
ing the Gulf War. Contrast those experiences with the Iraqi decision to
generally disregard the law of armed conflict dUring the war and in the months
immediately following the cease,fire. Repeated violations led to near universal
distrust of the Iraqi regime, which in tum contributed to the longevity of the
post,conflict monitoring, sanctions, and enforcement regimes. Regardless of
any tactical or operational objectives Saddam H.ussein may have hoped to ad,
vance by violating the law of armed conflict,44 he badly miscalculated the stra'
tegic consequences of his malfeasance. Similar disregard for the laws of armed
conflict (as well as human rights law) has severely complicated efforts to return
the Balkans to stability.
In each of these cases, decisions as to whether or not to comply with the laws
of armed conflict had-implications beyond what might have been immediately
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apparent. Analogous subtlety exists when considering prospective normative
regimes. The ICC Statute brouhaha offers multiple examples. Unconsented to
jurisdiction over U.S. 'personnel, an obvious consequence, is central to U.S.
hostility. But there are other somewhat more abstruse consequences. For in~
stance, by refusing to participate in the regime (as it now exists), and by align~
ing itself, however intentionally, with the global miscreants that populate the
opposition camp, the United States sets itself apart from virtually all of its key
partners. In doing so, it risks forfeiting some degree of normative stewardship
that it would otherwise exercise as the sole superpower. Indeed, opting out of a
regime as normatively axial as the Court could potentially tarnish the general
perception of the United States as committed to the rule oflaw (might criticism
of NATO-aka U.S.-bombing during Operation Allied Force portend future
skepticism towards U.S. compliance with the law of armed conflict?). Opting
out also forgoes an opportunity to aggressively lead the Court in directions that
advance U.S. interests.
On the other hand, by the terms of the Statute the Court is empowered to
exercise jurisdiction even over nationals of States that are not Party to it. 45 Of
course, many of the crimes enumerated admit\of universal jurisdiction, but ar~
guably the Statute goes beyond the present scope of such jurisdiction. That be~
ing so, it bears on the nature of the international law~making process,
particularly its consent~based predilection, and on the normative valence of
widely ascribed~to agreements. Thus, opposition to the jurisdictional provi~
sions may be justified by far broader concerns than the unlikely prospect that a
U.S. soldier may-one day be unjustly hauled before the Court; the subtler con~
sequences are perhaps the more insidious.
As should be apparent, it is absolutely essential that decision~makers ap~
praise strategies at every level of contact. What may seem appealing at one
level might prove disastrous at another. Further, the subtlety of
consequentiality is profound in the legal arena. Any urge to focus on the imme~
diately apparent consequences must be resisted lest a far more determinative
one be missed. The goal is not simply a strategy that fosters objectives (and
thereby interests) or deters threats thereto, but rather one that represents a net
advance of interests. To accurately calculate such advances requires robust
analysis.
The U.S. Environment
Although this essay is about the process of choice, not any particular U.S.
policy decision regarding the law of armed conflict, it may be useful to
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comment briefly on the strategic environment in which the U.S. will practice
normative choice, and to offer several thoughts on its ramifications. After all,
context is key, as has been repeatedly asserted.46
The pivotal event influencing the exercise of normative strategic choice is
the demise of Cold War bipolarity and the emergence of the United States as
the sole economic and military superpower. During the Cold War, the norma,
tive context was characterized by competition between two peer competitors.
Significantly, the competition was generally viewed as zero,sum. Both States
were powerful militarily and boasted a stable of client States with which they
maintained mutual defense pacts and which comprised a distinct economic
bloc. Although the United States would become involved in a number of
"lesser" conflicts, Vietnam being the most noteworthy, most were seen in terms
of their relationship to superpower rivalry. Moreover, in the national security
context, the conflict that mattered most was the one that never occurred, the
cold war turned hot. Reduced to basics, and somewhat oversimplified, issues
and events were viewed through the prism of u.S.,USSR competition. Since
the Soviets, particularly its military, were "equals," great vigilance was neces,
sary to ensure they did not slip ahead. For example, recall the anxiety that was
generated when Sputnik was launched in October 1957 (particularly over its
implications for the delivery of nuclear weapons against the U.S. homeland)
and the intense U.S. effort to "catch back up."
By the 1960s, a relative strategic stalemate had emerged, thereby exacerbat,
ing fear of any Soviet advantage. Because neither side dared let the other
achieve an edge, even small advances by an opponent loomed large. This atti,
tude, justified or not, inevitably led to difficulties in fashioning improvements
to the law of armed conflict and caused those that were proffered to be evalu,
ated microscopically. Given the strategic stalemate, minor issues took on great
significance.
In fact, the Cold War produced very little in the way oflaws of armed con'
flict. In 1954, the Cultural Property Convention was completed under the aus,
pices of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization,
but it is only very recently that the prospect of U.S. ratification appears likely.47
The two Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions were adopted in
1977, but the U.S. opposes the most significant of them, that governing inter'
national armed conflict, and has not yet ratified the other. Although the
United States objected strongly to certain of the Protocol's provisions at the
time, in retrospect one might query whether two decades of opposition to Ad,
ditional Protocol I have safeguarded U.S. interests in any discernable way. Af,
ter all, when have U.S. forces engaged in activities since 1977 that they would
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not otherwise have been allowed to had the U.S. been party to the instrument?
Nevertheless, in the context of the Cold War, concerns about both political issues (e.g., implied recognition of national liberation movements) and
warfighting limits (e.g., certain restrictions on striking dams, dikes, and nuclear
electrical generating stations) took on added importance. Other examples include U.S. hostility to Protocol III of the Conventional Weapons Convention
(incendiaries) and the U.S. refusal to ratify the 1925 Gas Protocol until 1975
out of fear that the agreement might reach the use of riot control agents and
herbicides or limit the response to a chemical attack to non-chemical means. 48
What the United States understood very clearly was that law does have a
shaping effect on the conduct of hostilities; it is an element of strategic control.
With a hostile, heavily armed peer competitor at hand, the U.S. sought to
avoid having law shape the battlefield in any way disadvantageous to it or advantageous to its adversary.
However, the strategic paradigm has changed. 49 Law still shapes, and clearly
can be used to the U.S. disadvantage, but the dynamic involved is very different. With no peer competitor on the immediate horizon, particularly in the
military realm, the calculations of strategic choice shift. For instance, the wide
U.S. technological advantage over potential adversaries, and the far greater redundancy of U.S. weapon systems, means that an inability to employ a single
type of weapon will often be less consequential to the U.S. than other States,
which may have neither alternatives available nor the technological wherewithal to timely develop one. Similarly, assume a proposed international agreement heightens the requirement for discrimination. The new "brilliant"
weapons being fielded by U.S. forces would allow it to comply more easily with
heightened standards than any other military. Even if the U.S. were to be precluded from striking a particular target that it would previously have been permitted to attack, its advantage in information systems will enable its forces to
find and destroy alternative targets capable of yielding analogous benefits far
more easily than its opponents.
Most importantly, the issue is no longer whether the unavailability of particular weapons or tactics will hurt the U.S. sans plus. Instead, the overwhelming
military superiority of its forces gives the U.S. the luxury of risking potential
"negative" security consequences in order to pursue alternative objectives and
interests. With an antagonistic peer competitor just over the horizon, security
loomed so large as an interest that it dwarfed all others. That is no longer the
case. On the contrary, U.S. dominance logically bestows on the United States
greater capacity to shape the international legal environment than it has ever
enjoyed. If the United States is to take advantage of this unique period, it must
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remember that objectives are both threat and opportunity~based. The balance
between the two has arguably shifted for the United States. While threat~based
objectives remain critical, they no longer need be all encompassing; it would
only seem logical that the United States should aggressively exploit the occa~
sion to "shape" the prescriptive landscape to its advantage.5o
Doing so requires a migration in strategic perspective not dissimilar from
that which has taken place in other arenas of national security strategy. During
the Cold War, Containment served U.S. national security interests well; some
maintain that it won the Cold War. However, Containment was ill~suited to
the strategic post~Cold War environment. The new context required a strategy
that exploited U.S. dominance, one that recognized the opportunities it pre~
sented-hence, the new U.S. national security strategy of "Engagement."51
A strategy of normative engagement could serve to leverage U.S. power in
much the same way. Such an approach would require the U.S. to proactively
lead the international community. A failure to exercise leadership allows po~
tential opponents, who well recognize the shaping import of law, to use it to
compensate for their own weaknesses. Indeed, from their perspective law can
be viewed as an instrument of asymmetrical warfare, for it is equally accessible
to everyone and, therefore, unlike technology (for instance) more widely ex~
ploitable. As an example, and regardless of how one views the substantive mer~
its of the case, there is little question but that the United States would have
suffered a serious strategic blow had the International Court ofJustice declared
the use of nuclear weapons contrary to international law in all circumstances.
Of course, the opinion was only advisory, but the persuasive import of such a
holding would have been measurable nevertheless and certainly a factor to be
considered in any strategic calculations. It would seem apparent, then, that in~
volvement in the process is the key, for international law is, by definition, a
multilateral process. The decision, for example, of the United States to partici~
pate in the post~Conference Preparatory Committee charged with drafting
rules of procedure, rules of evidence, and elements of the offenses for the ICC,
despite the U.S. vote against the Statute, is an extraordinarily sage one. The al~
ternative is to sit idly by while the rest of the global community crafts a legal re~
gime that will unquestionably affect U.S. military operations and personnel.
Given that there are more U.S. personnel deployed outside its borders than any
other State, to have refused to participate would approach irresponsibility.
Of course, in light of its sole superpower status, it would be tempting for the
United States to simply opt out of those proposed legal regimes that did not
completely meet U.S. desires. Any such approach would be shortsighted, par~
ticularly in ignoring the intangible, but very real, benefits that come with global
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participation and leadership. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the U.S. is in~
creasingly viewed as the boy who took his marbles and went home in the game
of international law. It does what it wants because it can, fashioning ex post
facto legal justifications therefore. Regardless of the accuracy of any such criti~
cism, the mere perception does violence to an overarching national security
strategy based on engagement.
Thus, the current international context offers the United States unprece~
dented, and very welcome, opportunities for normative engagement. In great
part, this is because the end of the Cold War moderated the normative threat
environment. Of course, to properly exploit this opportunity requires the exer~
cise of sagacious strategic choice. Unfortunately, although the new strategic
paradigm expands the scope of choice for the United States, choice has become
far more enigmatic. While the two~dimensionalism of the Cold War tempered
law's pluralistic character, the current global environment complicates it.
Final Thoughts
This essay has suggested that the law of armed conflict is a powerful form of
soft power capable of shaping the battlefield in consequential ways. As such,
decisions regarding proposed legal regimes or activities with normative import
are in fact serious strategic policy decisions. Unfortunately, informed intuition
is all too often relied upon to make the complex decisions necessary for opti~
mizing normative strategic choice. In response to this reality, the essay proffers
a skeletal decision process to facilitate choice, one designed to identify and as~
sess possible strategies in the context of the various objectives they advance or
harm. Since objectives, and the national interests they foster, do not equally
advance the welfare of a State (or may even operate at cross purposes), they
must be valued before strategic choice is possible. This allows for informed
choice regarding normative schemes that may advance or harm any number of
objectives and interests simultaneously in ways that are dependent on the con~
text in which they operate.
Lest this process be misinterpreted, it is perhaps best to conclude by reem~
phasizing what has not been asserted. First, the process suggested is neither
all~encompassing nor mathematical in nature. It simply represents a way to
think about normative regimes and activities with normative elements. The
goal is orderly thought processes as an alternative to resorting to informed intu~
ition alone in complex situations. There are certainly variables not mentioned
that might affect the process, and it is a subjective process that in the end relies
on the quality of human cognition.
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Second, it deserves mention that normative decisional processes do not op~
erate in strategic vacuums. Nor is international law a strategic panacea. A
State has multiple tools at its disposal to achieve objectives and foster its inter~
estSj law is but one. Therefore, even iflaw is an appropriate and sensible way to
advance an objective, it may not be the best one. The classic debate regarding
how best to effect human rights is illustrative. How should States respond to
abuses thereto? Normatively? Militarily? Economically? Through engagement
or isolation? A combination thereof? This essay only addressed normative anal~
ysisj further examination, particularly of alternatives to normative strategies,
remains to ~e accomplished before wise strategic choices can be made.
Third, the essay recommends no policy choices. While it does advocate nor~
mative engagement, engagement alone is a void which is meaningless without
substantive goals.
Fourth, there has been no argument for decision making based only on a
State's individual selfish interests. Instead, the process suggested merely recog~
nizes that the reality of State~centrism dictates, at least for the foreseeable fu~
ture, how States make strategic choices. Ultimately, it is their auto~
interpretation of national interests that matters when they decide how the
global normative architecture should best be constructed. Some States will end
up making moral choices, others immoral ones. Hopefully, most will conclude
that the former comports most closely with their national interests.
Finally, and most important, the essay begs the question of the precise nor~
mative strategies the United States should pursue to advance its national inter~
ests. Whatever the right answer may be, U.S. strategy must be infused with a
recognition that U.S. national interests have always been, and must remain,
heavily value laden. Indeed, superpower status involves both rights and duties.
As the next millennium approaches, those duties clearly include benevolent
custodianship of global human dignity and well~being.
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